Learning among joint venture sophisticated firms by Lyles, Marjorie A.

UNIVERSHV OF
ILLINOIS LIBRARY
AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
BOOKSTACKS
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
http://www.archive.org/details/learningamongjoi1366lyle

STX
BEBR
FACULTY WORKING
PAPER NO. 1366
THE LIBRARY Of THE
JUL 6 1987
UNIV. OF ILLINOIS
Learning among Joint Venture Sophisticated Firms
Marjorie A. Lyles
COMMERCE LIBRARY
JUL 1 1987
UR6ANA-CHAMPAIGN
College of Commerce and Business Administration
Bureau of Economic and Business Research
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

BEBR
FACULTY WORKING PAPER NO. 1366
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
June 1987
Learning among Joint Venture Sophisticated Firms
Marjorie A. Lyles, Assistant Professor
Department of Business Administration
Correspondence may be directed to
Majorie A. Lyles
4401 N. Pennsylvania
Indianapolis, IN 46205

-2-
LEARNING AMONG JOINT VENTURE SOPHISTICATED FIRMS
Abstract
This paper explores the role of organizational learning in four firms,
each having over thirty years of joint venture experience. Comparative
analysis of these firms, two American and two European, reveals patterns in
how the learning occurred and in what learning occurred.
Funds for this research were supplied by the University of Illinois
Research Board, the Department of Business Administration and the Hewlett
Fund .
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INTRODUCTION
More firms are utilizing joint ventures for the first time to increase
their strategic capabilities and global competitiveness. Yet the use of
cooperative alliances among firms, in particular, joint ventures, are contro-
versial topics both to academics and practitionerss (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978;
Pennings , 1981). Strategic and international management theorists have
studied individual joint ventures to determine the reasons for formation, the
factors for success and the cultural implications (Franko , 1971; Killing,
1982; Stopford & Wells, 1972). Economic analysis has attempted to provide
economic rationales for joint ventures and the impact on research and develop-
ment (Berg, Duncan, & Friedman, 1982; Harrigan, 1985; Hladik, 1985; Pfeffer &
Nowak, 1976). Prior studies have not led to a greater understanding of the
joint venturing process from a corporate viewpoint nor of the learning that
has accumulated from past experiences. Thus, for strategic management a
critical question remaining is to what extent firms have learned from this
process and whether joint venturing contributes to a firm's strategic capa-
bilities .
This study documents the learning that has occurred in firms that have
been successful at operating multiple joint ventures in an international con-
text. It seeks to determine how- these firms developed new programs and
structures, innovated, and created new frames of reference in order to adapt
and to learn. It builds upon the work of Chandler (1962), Cyert and March
(1963), and Miles (1982) who have addressed the learning process in complex
organizations as they coped with environmental stress. It attempts to fill
the gaps in the research on joint ventures by exploring how joint venturing
experiences have increased the competitive edge of the parenting firms. For
our purposes, a joint venture (JV) is considered to be an independent entity
formed by two or more parent firms.
The term "learning" refers .to the development of insights, knowledge and
associations between past actions, the effectiveness of those actions, and
future actions (Fiol & Lyles, 1985). Learning is the process in which growinj
insights and successful restructuring of organizational problems reflect them-
selves in structural elements and outcomes (Chandler, 1962; Chakravarthy
,
1982; Hedberg, 1981; Miller & Friesen, 1980). Hence, learning is both action
outcomes and changes in the state of knowledge. When seen in a learning con-
text, a host of issues about joint venturing activities may be better under-
stood by both the researcher and the practitioner.
Longitudinal studies in the strategic management field are rare. Rarer
yet are research studies that aim to understand the learning that takes place
as firms attempt to survive and change under dynamic environmental conditions
While organizational learning has recently been identified as important in
strategic management, it has received remarkably little attention by re-
searchers. For these reasons, this study is exploratory in nature and will
attempt to allow the important issues to emerge from the data (Glaser &
Strauss, 1967).
The paper addresses the issue of whether learning occurred in joint ven-
ture experienced firms, how it occurred, and what was learned. It represents
a subset of an ongoing research project on JV sophisticated firms. Four firms
two American and two European, were chosen to participate in the study based
on their extensive JV experience. Appendix I gives a summary description of
the firms. The paper begins by identifying the conceptual framework used to
assess the learning patterns. It then presents the results of interviews
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conducted with each firm on the firm's joint venturing experiences and what
has been learned. Finally, implications are suggested.
THE LEARNING FRAMEWORK
Organizational adjustment is an essential element of a firm's ability to
survive and to sustain competitiveness over time. Fiol and Lyles (1985) sug-
gest that it is necessary to separate mere adjustment decisions from deeper
changes, such as in the belief structures, values, and norms. They argue that
learning occurs at two levels, higher- and lower-. Lower-level learning may
be apparent from observing the actions that are taken and the structural
changes that are made. On the other hand, higher-level learning represents
changing associations, frames of reference and programs that beg a methodology
that analyzes the more in-depth functioning of an organization. In order to
study learning in JV sophisticated firms, it is necessary to look not only at
the way the JVs were implemented but also to examine the attitudes and values
of the management.
Figure 1 represents the franework for determining if learning occurred and
what learning occurred as a result of these joint venturing activities. The
figure shows the interrelatedness of lower-level and higher-level learning and
the .roles that unlearning and experimentation play in creating new learning.
Each of these will be discussed below.
Insert Figure 1 about here
Levels of Learning
Lower-level learning. Lower-level learning is a result of repetition and
routine and involves association building. Cyert and March (1963) identify
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standard operating procedures or success programs, goals, and decision rules
as illustrative of learning based on routine. It occurs in contexts that are
well understood and where management thinks it can control the situation
(Duncan, 1974). Two types of lower-level learning will be discussed below:
success programs and management systems.
Success programs. Organizations that exist for any length of time develop
standard methods for handling repetitive decisions that become standard oper-
ating procedures. These are successful methodologies that have worked in the
past, and organizations resist changing them. They can be quickly utilized
rather than reassessing the decision situation each time it arises (Cyert &
March, 1963).
Management systems. Galbraith (1973) suggests that firms will also de-
velop management systems to handle their information processing needs in
repetitive, unchanging situations. The management systems include the poli-
cies, hierarchies, rewards, and administrative systems that reflect how the
organization has learned to handle reoccurring situations. It is generally
traumatic for the organization to restructure or to implement new management
systems (Cyert & March, 1963).
Higher-level learning. The adjustment of overall missions, beliefs and
norms is higher-level learning. These have long terra effects and impact the
whole organization, not just the joint venture or a division. Over time,
every organization faces the need for renewal and for reanalysis of its mis-
sion and basic capabilities. Evidence suggests that higher-level learning
often results in new frames of reference, new skills for problem formulation
or agenda setting, new values, or unlearning of past success programs (Lyles
& Mitroff, 1980; Miller & Friesen, 1980; Starbuck, 1983). Three types of
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higher-level learning will be discussed next: discrimination skills, unlearn-
ing, and innovation.
Discrimination skills. An organization that can utilize different success
programs and management systems for different situations has learned to dis-
criminate. In other words, higher-level learning includes the ability to dis-
criminate among different decision situations and to choose appropriate be-
haviors or actions for each situation.
Unlearning. Firms that can unlearn and reframe their past success pro-
grams to fit with changing environmental and situational conditions will have
a greater likelihood of survival and adaptation (Hedberg, 1981; Starbuck, 1983)
Unlearning is particularly important at the strategic level where each deci-
sion situation may be unique and where past success may not be an indication
of future success. Miles (1982) argues that negative performance feedback
precipitates the search for new methods for handling decisions and problems.
Hence, unlearning is triggered by mistakes, failures, or poor performance.
Innovation or experimentation. The ability to develop fresh approaches to
situations or problems indicates a new dimension to higher-order learning.
Experimentation may generate conceptual leaps in the development of associa-
tions and may result in the changing of the old success programs or norms. It
represents a disassociation with the reinforcement of past behaviors and a
reaction to the momentum that builds up (Starbuck, 1983). Innovation or ex-
perimentation may be closely tied to unlearning and is necessary for organi-
zational renewal and the development of new capabilities.
This study describes the learning that is reported by the upper management
of four JV sophisticated firms. It determines whether lower- and higher-level
is reported and what patterns emerged. Next the methodology will be discussed.
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METHODOLOGY
Four firms were selected based on their long histories with joint ventur-
ing and their current involvement in multiple JVs . Each has at least thirty
years JV experience, at least twenty ongoing JVs, and experiences with a
variety of JV configurations in numerous locations.
A triangulation of data collection methods was used to query each firm
about its JV experiences, about specific JVs, and about the learning that
occurred. In-depth interviews were conducted with corporate management, staff
and line management and with the JV management. At least eight people were
interviewed at each firm, with the maximum number being about forty. The
interviews were conducted in the United States and in Europe and lasted an
average of two hours. The companies and the individual managers were very
cooperative and allowed the researcher to return for multiple interviews. In
this manner, the researcher had the opportunity to raise additional questions,
to clarify certain events, or to probe deeper regarding an event. To verify
the verbal reports, two other kinds of data were necessary: publicly avail-
able information (such as annual reports, newspaper clippings), and company
archival data (such as minutes from board meetings, memos, etc.).
The interviews were semi -structured , asking each participant to recon-
struct his/her personal involvement in JVs, the historical evolutions of the
firm's JV strategies, and the factors affecting future JV decisions. Ques-
tions regarding past joint ventures were straightforward such as asking about
the reporting or management structures, the amount of involvement of the
parent firm in the JV, and the successes/failures.
Data from the interviews were coded and were verified by the archival
data, the person interviewed, or other informants. Alternative viewpoints
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about events were identified and served as probes for later interviews or wre
verified by the other data.
This methodology is appropriate because information about a firm's learn-
ing is not available outside that firm, it requires an in-depth analysis, and
learning is a lagged phenomenon. Although the sample size of four firms is
small, an in-depth analysis of each firm was possible. The interviews built
statements based on reconstructed logic, but the events could be verified by
checking thera in the formal reports or external documents. Statements of
learning were perceptual and subject to individual biases and judgments; how-
ever, the use of multiple informants helps to minimize this bias.
RESULTS
Each firm was analyzed to determine its JV approach based on the inter-
views, the detailed information about specific JVs , and the archival data
(Table 1). The firms varied between allowing the JV decentralized control
versus centralized control from the parent. Three of the four firms licensed
their technology with the JVs, but one firm licensed its technology but also
received technologies from its partners. Three firms were willing to take
minority positions, and all of the firms wanted their partners to have an
active part in the management of the JVs. Each also said that they would pre-
fer wholly-owned subsidiaries to JVs. However, JVs were a necessary component
of their global competitiveness. Next the analysis of the learning framework
is presented.
Insert Table 1 about here
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Success Programs /Management Systems
The two types of lower-level learning represent ways of doing things that
were successful in the past. The research looked for decision rules or ways
of handling JVs that are repeated and worked well and for structures, report-
ing systems, management methods, etc., that were repeated across the JVs.
Two firms said there was an usual way of handling JVs and two firms said
there was not. Of the two "yes" firms, each had different approaches to its
success program. Cl's approach was decentralized, allowing each JV to make
important decisions about its operations but to provide guidance from the
parent corporation. CI provides the technology but no management contracts.
It maintains control of the JV through informal means such as socialization
of the management and low turnover among the management. "Get good people and
give them freedom" was the rule.
On the other hand, C2's usual way is to have 50% equity, not to partici-
pate in the management, and to maintain control over the technology. The
management of C2 claim that this is changing. One person said, "There was a
usual way, but it is changing. We were not ready to place our people in a
JV. We wanted our 50% equity position. Now we are willing to place our tech-
nology into minority positions wherever new opportunities are coming."
Both firms who have a usual way also said that in the future, there were
not going to be any rules. The two other firms said they have no hard and
fast rules in their approaches, except that they do require the use of their
financial reporting systems. All four firms indicate that what they had
learned over time is that flexibility is the best approach.
Discrimination skills. One higher-level learning technique is the ability
to discriminate when a certain behavior or action is appropriate and when it
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ls not. This is situational analysis. The researcher looked for certain de-
cision rules for defining the attributes of the JVs that meant they would be
treated one way versus another.
Three firms said they are flexible. One respondent said, "I would say
that it's a case of being realistic. I think we are realistic in adjusting
to the local situations."
Although the respondents indicate that the firms are becoming better at
changing their management techniques based on the situation, the researcher
found little evidence of this in three of the firms. The JV data and the
interviews did not indicate any decision rules for segmenting the JVs into
situations where one method would be used versus another. In C2, however,
where there was a usual way for handling JVs, discrimination skills were re-
quired to determine when this usual way was appropriate.
Unlearning. Part of learning is unlearning and reframing past behaviors
or success programs that are no longer appropriate. To determine if unlearn-
ing occurs, one must look for environmental jolts, mistakes or failures,
critical incidents, or changes in the success programs or management systems.
Table 2 summarizes the events mentioned by the respondents. Two categories,
future conflicts and partner rapport, were identified within three firms as
influencing their learning. Both of these concern maintaining a good partner
relationship.
Insert Table 2 about here
Future Conflicts acknowledge that at formation, there may be mixed motives
and hidden agendas by both firms. One firm formed a JV to have its products
manufactured and marketed in a particular country. As time passed, the parent
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company acquired Che skills necessary to market the product themselves—and
they thought their skills were better than the JV's. This created a conflict.
What the firms learned is to accept that the JV's reasons-for-being may
change over time and to recognize that they want to acquire their partner's
skills over a period of time. One person said, "The only general learning is
that you have to be very, very careful that you think, of all the potential
conflicts of interest. It's more likely in your core business, core countries,
than on the fringe." It appears that when the firms had less JV experience,
they believed that a JV was forever and that there would be minimal conflicts.
Issues relating to maintaining partner rapport were frequently mentioned.
These were verbalized as "lessons" such as "You should treat your partners
with 49,Jo as if they were yourself," "Have the firm's president meet with top
partners when he is travelling," and "The ventures have got to satisfy the
real desires of both parties to be successful." These were seen as important
as the firms learned to deal with the ambiguity of the JVs ' futures.
Partner Choice is important because of the potential for conflict. The
firms would not choose a partner with the same international aspirations as
theirs because they would then meet them head-on somewhere. Also they have
learned not to form a JV with people who want the JV as a way to save their
own company, as a life buoy.
The two American firms view Technology Transfer as an area in which they
made mistakes. They said that it takes experience to recognize that once you
license your mature or stable technology, you sell your business and create a
new competitor.
Cultural differences has been discussed in the literature as a problem in
JVs because of country differences and firm differences (Wright, 1979). None
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of the firms mention this as a reason for a mistake or failure, although it
was mentioned as important for getting along with your partner.
Innovativeness . Innovativeness indicates an ability to move away from
the learned responses of the success programs and to experiment with new ap-
proaches. Table 3 summarizes the responses.
Insert Table 3 about here
It was expected that as firms gain JV experience, they would become more
risk-taking as they grew comfortable with joint venturing. Three firms indi-
cated that they were more risk-taking now. One respondent from the fourth firm
said: "You take the decision that has the most pro's and con's and the best
risk profile. So in this respect, we look at JVs like any other alternative."
This last firm is also the firm that had the most flexible approach to JVs.
From analysis of the interviews, it became clear that two different kinds
of risk were being discussed. The first was financial risk and indicates
whether the firms would be willing to forego financial returns. Managerial
risk, the second, represents giving up control over the JV decision-making or
the technology. Taking a smaller equity position, licensing the technology,
or participating in management were indications of this kind of risk.
This analysis shows that three firms would not forego financial returns or
sacrifice profitability. If they foresaw that the JV might be a financial
risk, they would not be involved. One person said, "Early on we didn't go
into JVs because of profitability. I think today, we will not go into them
unless they are going to be profitable. Early on we went for market share."
On the other hand, two firms indicate that they would take managerial
risks. One person said, "We are willing to take risks by starting with a
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sraall equity position and expecting to increase our share over time." Another
person from the same firm said, "As a large company, you must be willing some-
times to take a minority interest with a smaller partner." With the right
partner, it is possible to take risks on the amount of the equity position.
The JV experienced firms reconfirm the importance of profitability since
there is no reason to sacrifice profitability because you are Ln a JV. How-
ever, it is possible to take risks when you are referring to the management
systems. Three firms are trying new ways of doing things. The new ways are
such things as developing lateral communication links, being more open to dif-
ferent kinds of partner firms, licensing a technology that had been closely
protected, or foregoing some control in order to get their "name" utilized.
Transference of learning. The respondents unanimously agreed that there
was a transference of learning from multiple JV experiences, although some of
it was indirect and informal. For example, the single-business firm, C4
,
found that "We were finding out, from experiences elsewhere in the world, that
our partners are less interested in our business than we are: they had many
other operations in other business areas. We slowly started to understand
that we had to contribute much more to the management."
The transference takes place through the people and is influenced by the
organizational structure. One respondent said: "The type of people you need
in managerial/operational positions in a JV is different from the type of
people you need in a wholly-owned subsidiary because they need more diplomatic
qualities." These same people develop networks that serve to disseminate
their experiences.
Insert Table 4 about here
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The firms use their joint venture experiences as a credential which makes
it easier for them to form new joint ventures. They are viewed as better
partners and they have experienced people. One person said, "Ue now have a
cadre of people well qualified to enter JV negotiations, well qualified to
handle problems in JVs and that is the result of experiences that began in the
1950's."
Table 4 summarizes the methods used for the transference of learning, and
it lists the topics that emerged from the interviews. The respondents recog-
nize that top management in its role of overseeing all the joint ventures play
an active role in sharing the lessons learned. Communication and socializa-
tion of managers become important methods for the transference of these
lessons and norms
.
LEARNING PATTERNS
The learning within the four firms was demonstrated in several ways.
These firms have a high frequency of joint ventures and place importance on
them as a means for implementing the firm's overall strategic direction.
Joint ventures are recognized by each of the firms as a necessary condition
for maintaining global competitiveness. Hence, these firms identify that JVs
help them to reach their goals. The evidence of continued JV usage and of
meeting strategic goals provides insight into the experienced gained and into
the learning that occurred.
The organizational histories and statements by the management reveal how
the firms learned. They are transmitted by the people, by the sharing of ex-
periences, by the development of organizational stories, and by the develop-
ment of management systems. The backgrounds of the individual managers reveal
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the extensive direct experience in the forming, managing, negotiating, and
problem-solving with the JV partners and management. The upper-level manage-
ment of these firms provide the medium for the transference of the learning.
What the firms learned from their JV experiences is somehow both unique
and general. It is unique in the sense that each firm has its own unique
characteristics and histories, and it is general in the sense that there
exists some pattern to the learning that is generalizable across the firms.
Listed below are several learning patterns that were gleaned from the inter-
views .
1. Routine success programs and management systems can be used successfully
for joint venturing if the firm enacts its environment.
Firms that joint venture operate in the most complex of environments: not
only are they dealing with environmental complexity in their home markets but
also with cultural complexity and the environmental stress of multiple markets
Strategic management researchers appear to argue that in environments of high
uncertainty and complexity, firms should attempt to operate with flexibility
and in a decentralized mode (Lawrence & Dyer, 1983; Meyer, 1982). In this
study we find that three of the firms are doing just that, namely, operating
in a very flexible, decentralized manner.
Yet the fourth firm presents an alternative to this approach. It has
maintained the use of its usual way of handling JVs by enacting the environ-
ment. It has chosen to set up JVs only in environments that meet certain
criteria and then to use its success programs. It is operating under the same
environmental conditions as the other firms but sets constraints on the ele-
ments that it considers as most important, namely, the partner firms, tech-
nology and extent of management involvement.
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2. Initial decisions about licensing, equity position and management rela-
tions, although appropriate at the time they were made , frequently constrained
choices and created conflicts later.
Since the firms were among the first to use JVs , they began cautiously
without prior knowledge or experience or the ability to learn from their
peers' experiences. Consequently, each developed comfortable ways or success
programs for handling the JV management. These reflect the cultures and norms
of the parent firms which were accepting of new cultures and management ap-
proaches .
Nonetheless, the initial reasons for the JVs and the original management
systems became obsolete over time (Harrigan, 1985). Lyles (1985) documents
how the desire for involvement and the desire for control change over time.
The initial contracts, legal statements, or agreements focused attention on
the wrong set of issues. This came as a surprise to the parent firms' manage-
ment. It also created conflicts in their relationships with their partner
firms. The firms in this sample learned to accept such changes as part of the
nature of joint venturing and to recognize the need for continuing conversa-
tions with their partner firms.
3. The importance of partner rapport increased over time.
Many of the JVs that these four firms maintained were over 10 years old.
In fact, some were over 20 years old. Then firms experienced industry changes,
market maturation, and their own growth and development. Initially it did not
seem that partner firms were closely investigated: they were chosen because
they were known by the parent firms. Now however these partner firms are
chosen for good business reasons. With time, the firms in the study have
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learned how to assess markets, partners, and potential contributions of part-
ner firms
.
There is the knowledge that JV management is difficult and time consuming
and as a JV matures, it is harder to control (Prahalad & Doz, 1981). There-
fore it is very important to have a good partner and to maintain a good rela-
tionship with that partner. Social relations with your partner remain impor-
tant because they help to build trust into the relationship.
4. Management attitudes have changed over time from viewing JVs as a "choice"
to a "necessary evil."
A widely held belief among researchers and practitioners is that if one
wants to do business on a global scale, it is necessary to JV (Hout, Porter, &
Rudden, 1982). The firms in this sample have learned that it is not easy to
maintain a relationship over time and that it takes more time than a wholly
owned subsidiary. Joint venturing is still uncomfortable: it is particularly
difficult for the American firms to loosen their grip on management controls
(Lyles & Reger, 1987).
5. The complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity of JVs is still uncomfortable
for the firms, but more accurate knowledge of the future probability of cer-
tain events has come with experience.
With the growth of their experience base, the firms have begun to identify
certain events that may occur during a JVs life. For example, these firms
have learned that partners may acquire their partners' skills, that partner
firms may be merger targets and may change hands, and that technology can be
a valuable asset in joint venturing. With this increased knowledge, these JV
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experienced firms are better able to anticipate major issues and how to handle
them.
6. The development of higher-level learning spread to all levels of the
organization.
The organizational learning was incorporated into thy respondents' state-
ments and was evident in the belief systems, the norms, and the value es-
poused. Joint venturing was an accepted norm of doing business. All four
firms sought to increase their global competitiveness by introducing an mar-
keting their products, technologies, and name recognitions abroad. Joint
venturing was one acceptable method for doing this.
Good partner rapport was an accepted value. It is extremely important
because each firm has to have the reputation of being a good partner. Tie
world is getting smaller, and the partner firms within an industry generally
know each other. A firm has to have the reputation of being competent but
also compassionate and trusted. Fairness in negotiations and recognition of
their partners' own competence became essential norms for the managers deal-
ing with JVs . These were learned attributes of the JV experienced firms.
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
This paper has addressed the learning that has occurred in JV sophisti-
cated firms. We have pointed out some of the learning patterns that emerged
and the nature of the higher-level learning patterns. The firms have built
upon their experiences and maintained flexibility in their approaches to JVs.
This has resulted in multiple experiences, successes, experimentations, and
failures that has led to the richness of their own corporate histories and
schemata. It creates a depth to the organization that transcends highly
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decentralized organization structures. It reaffirms that the experiences,
beliefs, and norms are transmitted through the people and management of Che
firms (Martin, 1982).
The JV experience of these firms may be viewed as a "window of opportun-
ity" for increasing their global competitiveness. It creates a competitive
advantage for them by establishing their presence worldwide, by giving thera
information about operating in various countries and about environmental
events, and by the development of a skill base that has prior knowledge of the
likelihood of certain events. This increases their strategic capabilities and
provides thera a competitive advantage (Jemison, 1986; Lenz, 1980). It pro-
vides thera power and influence.
The firms recognize that the quality of their partner relationships may be
just as important as the JV mission since they may affect the firm's corporate
global strategy (Thorelli, 1986). This provides them a sense of cautiousness
and patience. It provides them a motivation to develop their reputations as
trustworthy bedfellows, which allows them to influence others. It provides
thera a strategic advantage over firms with less experience.
The strength of this study lies in the in-depth nature of the investiga-
tion of each firm. However, it is only the first step in analyzing the impor-
tance of learning as a strategic capability. Future investigations need to
address whether the learning patterns are useful to other firms and whether
the learning process can be further analyzed.
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APPENDIX I
DESCRIPTION OF FIRMS
COMPANY GROSS SALES MAJOR LINES OF BUSINESS
CI S7.1 BILLION CHEMICAL PRODUCTS, COATINGS,
PHARMACEUTICALS, CONSUMER PRODUCTS,
MISC. PRODUCTS.
C2 $6.3 BILLION AIR CONDITIONING, CHEMICAL AND
PLASTICS, INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS,
FINANCIAL SERVICES, PROTECTIVE
SERVICES, TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT.
C3 $3.5 BILLION INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS, PETROLEUM
EQUIPMENT, DEFENSE EQUIPMENT,
PERFORMANCE CHEMICALS, SPECIALIZED
MACHINERY.
C4 $2.0 BILLION BREWING, SOFT DRINKS, WINE.
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APPENDIX I (continued)
CORPORATE CHARACTERISTICS
—
-
——
—
——-— — - -
*--
—
-
CHARACTERISTICS CI C2 C3 C4
Corporate
St rue ture
Worldwide
Products
Overseen by
Regional
General
Managers
Worldwide
Products
Worldwide
Products
Interface
with
International
Department
Regional
General
Manage rs
Culture Entrepreneurial Protective Introspective Introspect
Management
Approach
Decentralized Centralized Decentralized Centralize
JV Motivations Dive rse Sell Technology
Ge t Ro ya 1 1 i e s
Sell Technology
Get Market
Sell Techo
Ge t Ma rke t
Current Pace
of JV
Format ion
Steady Slowed Slowed Steady
Definition of
JV Success
Prof itabili ty
and Operating
Ease
Prof itabili ty Profitability
and Operating
Ease
Stability
and
Performanc
JV Industries Mature Mature Mature Mature
Areas of JV Main Business
Area
Main Business
Area
Main Business
Area
Main Bus in
Area
Decentralized
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TABLE I
PROFILE OF JV APPROACHES
Central ized
CI C3 C4 C2
Did Not Want
Management
Control
C2 CI C3 C4
Wanted
Management
Control
Treated Each JV
In A Similar Way
C2 C3 C4
CI
Treated Each
JV Differently
Received
Technology
CI
—
X---
C2
C3
C4
Licensed Own
Technology
Will Take
Minority
Equity
Position
-X-
Cl
C2
C4
C3
Wanted Equity
Control
Partners' People
In Management
C2 C4
CI
C3
Wanted Own
People In
Management
Undeveloped
Discrimination
Skills
CI
C2
C4
C2
Developed
Discrimination
Skills
TABLE 2
UNLEARNING /MI STAKES
TYPES
FIRMS
CI C2 C3 C4
BUILDING IN FUTURE CONFLICTS X X X
PARTNER RAPPORT ISSUES X X X
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER ISSUES X X
CULTURAL ISSUES
HUMAN RESOURCE X
FUTURISTIC ISSUES X X
EQUITY ISSUES X
PARTNER CHOICE X
-28-
TABLE 3
INNOVATIONS: TAKING RISKS
MORS RISK-TAKING
FIRMS
CI C2 C3 C'i
YES
NO X
X X X
TAKING FINANCIAL RISKS CI C2 C3 C4
YES
NO X
X
X X
TAKING MANAGERIAL RISKS CI C2 C3 C4
YES
NO
X
X
X X
-29-
TABLE 4
TRANSFERENCE OF LEARNING
METHODS OF TRANSFERENCE
—--—----
-
—
—
FIRMS
CI C2 C3 C4
TOP MANAGEMENT OVERSEEING PROCESS X X X X
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS X
TRAINING AND SOCIALIZATION X X
DIRECT MANAGEMENT JV EXPERIENCE X X X
MANAGEMENT NETWORKS X X
TOPICS CI C2 C3 C4
GEOGRAPHIC/CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE V
.1 X
DEVELOPMENT OF PARTNER RELATIONS X X X X
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS X
INTERRELATEDNESS OF JVs X X X
JV NEGOTIATION/MANAGEME NT SKILLS X
TIME ORIENTATION (LONG/SHORT) X X
FIGURE I
LEARNING FRAMEWORK
SUCCESS
PROGRAMS
MANAGEMENT
SYSTEMS
LOWER, LEVEL
EXPERIMENTATION
(INNOVATION)
UNLEARNING
UPPER LEVEL'
ORGANIZATIONAL SCHEMATA DISCRIMINATION SKILLS
FRAMES OF REFERENCE
BELIEF SYSTEMS
MEMORY
VALUES & NORMS
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